The applicant requests that the November 14 receipt and the old September 17 option be converging as integrated documents. This creates an ambiguity that requires the court to determine the intent of the parties. The tribunal adopted the complainant`s theory and admitted extrinsic evidence, but opted for the respondent. The Tribunal expressly stated that the parties did not intend to make the applicant a third-party beneficiary and that there was no agreement that the respondent would pay the applicant for improvements to the division of the two lots while the Hales held it. Since the Tribunal did not believe the complainant`s witness as to the intent of the parties and the alleged respondent, this jurisdiction is bound by the Tribunal`s judgment.  The testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient to support a finding, even if all the other witnesses testify to the contrary. (Francis v. City – County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 2d 335, 340 [282 pp. 2d 496]; Sim v. weeks, 7 Cal.
App. 2d 28, 39 [45 P.2d 350].)  In any event, the complainant has no reason to file a complaint, since the Tribunal had no reason to admit extrinsious evidence. The November 14 contract is clear as it covers road, sanitation or other ratings or improvements. It`s [181 Cal. Towards 2d 591], no reference to subdivision improvements that were not a pawn against real estate. The agreement of 14 November also does not contain the agreement of 17 September by reference. Therefore, the agreement of 14 November, which is free of ambiguities, must be alone and the meaning of the agreement derives from its terms. (Ucovich v. Basil, Jr., 26 Cal. About 2d 272, 276 [79 p.2d 188]; Reid v.
Johnson, 85 Cal. App. 2d 112, 116 [195 P.2d 106]; Briggs v. Marcus-Lesoine, Inc., 3 Cal. App. 2d 207, 212 [39 P.2d 442]; Sass v. Hank, 108 Cal. App. 2d 207, 211 [238 p.2d 652].) The agreement of 14 November clearly supports the Tribunal`s conclusion that the applicant to the appeal was not, under and on its terms, a third party beneficiary. The complainant filed a counter-action, which refers to [181 Cal. 2d 586] of a separate transaction.
When the wing land was handed over to the complainant Subdivider, the owners, Mr. and Mrs. Hale, reserved ownership of two lots. The subdivision plan registered by the complainant as a proponent, for which she recorded a performance obligation, was no exception to the two lots. The complainant argues that the Hales will pay her for any improvements to the division of their lots. At one point, after the improvements were made, the Hales gave the respondent a 60-day list of the property, as well as an option to purchase it. Within 60 days, the respondent made use of the option and the parties entered into an agreement entitled «Just of Deposit.» In his counterclaim, the applicant argues that he was a third party beneficiary in the agreements between the Hales and the respondent and, as such, has the right to seek improvements from the respondents. The Tribunal refused to recover the complainant as a result of his counter-action.